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Comments on Operation Overlord 
by Major-General R.F.L. Keller, CBE, 
General Officer Commanding
3rd Canadian Infantry Division
as given to Historical Officer, 21 June 1944
Nearly one year was devoted to the training and preparations of the Canadian assault 
division and to the formulating of the assault 
teams, right down to that of the smallest 
formation. One can cite, for instance, the use of 
mock-up craft, taped out, or built of galvanized 
iron, burlap screens and forms six foot folding, 
representing the starboard, port and keel benches 
of a Landing Craft Assault (LCA), the use of 
scrambling nets, the practice of getting from the 
deck of a Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) into a LCA, 
the marriage, so to speak, of the recce element of 
the beach groups (the speedy developments of the 
beaches to take vehicles, wheeled and tracked), 
and the assault brigades, the co-ordination of 
Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and Forward 
Officer Bombardment (FOB) so that artillery 
support both from what artillery had been landed 
and what artillery was still seaborne could be 
quickly brought down wherever the infantry 
might be held up. 
There were four distinct phases of training, 
patiently and devotedly carried out:
(1) The preliminary phase, done mainly 
in South England; wherever the battalions 
or regiments were quartered, with mock-
up craft, practice scaling ladders, small 
assault courses, etc.
(2) Basic training, i .e.  combined 
operations in Scotland on a company, 
squadron and battery level.
(3) Brigade Group exercises with a naval 
force, with and without fire support.
(4) Even larger-scale exercises with 
full fire support against realistically 
constructed enemy beach sectors, 
stressing the practice, once ashore, 
of getting rapidly inland to widen the 
beachhead to that of a covering position.
 It will be obvious that the third and fourth 
stages required close liaison – indeed the actual 
physical co-operation – of both naval and air 
components. Despite the current operational 
tasks of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, this 
was achieved. 
 At this time it was apparent that special assault 
equipment was necessary and this was indeed 
provided, e.g. on the Army side, self-propelled 
artillery, both field and anti-tank, Duplex Drive 
(DD) or “swimming” tanks, armoured assault 
engineers, i.e. Churchills with petards, bridges, 
fascines, etc., flails mounted on Shermans for 
the destruction of mines, assault ladders, mine 
detectors, special marking tapes and signs, 
shaped charges, waterproof covers for certain 
weapons, including the rifle, the waterproofing 
of vehicles to enable them to wade in the surf 
and still not destroy their electrical circuits. The 
Royal Navy produced the rocket craft, and the 
seaborne multiple mortar or bombard, known as 
the “Hedgerow”. By patient trial and experiments, 
and under varying conditions of sea, tide, light, 
etc., proficiency in shooting the self-propelled 
artillery and Royal Navy fire support craft from 
the sea was attained. Wireless sets, sometimes 
carried by hand and sometimes mounted on light 
go-carts, were also fitted with devices to sustain 
immersion in seawater. Even special sea-sick 
pills for personnel were produced, tried and 
found of value. All assault personnel were taken 
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to sea and kept at sea in all weathers in order to 
make them seaworthy and conversant with naval 
procedure. In fact, by May 1944, 3 Canadian 
Division could well have been described as being 
“web-footed.”
 Throughout these arduous months the 
highest team spirit was engendered in the 
assault force, not, repeat, not in water-tight 
compartments, such as infantry, artillery, naval 
crews, etc., but on the principle that all members 
of the team help each other, and that all teams 
assist other teams, with the rough objective, 
first that every fighting soldier be landed with 
his arms, ammunition and equipment on the 
enemy’s shore, and secondly, that he got across 
the beaches quickly to the designated objective 
or objectives. 
 In the actual assault the weather was far 
from ideal and the distance to be travelled in 
the dark with a considerable sea running caused 
certain elements of craft carrying Armoured 
Vehicles Royal Engineers (AVRE) and DD tanks 
to get into the wrong swept channels westward 
of the main assault force. By cool and skillful 
instructors the Commodore commanding Force 
J recovered these lost craft, but this caused them 
to be rather late in touching down; consequently, 
fewer obstacles were cleared away on the beaches 
than was hoped, as by this time the tide rose and 
covered them. The DD tanks, of whom only less 
than half swam in (the rest were carried in and 
landed on the beaches direct from Landing Craft 
Tanks (LCT)) were also slightly late in touching 
down and slightly less than half of those that 
swam were drowned or otherwise lost. 
 But, by and large, the mechanics of the 
assault and the lines along which we had trained, 
did work, i.e., the DD tanks touched down and 
remained touched down, hull-down in sea, and 
engaged by direct fire what beach guns they could 
see. Approximately fifteen minutes later (i.e., ten 
minutes late) the AVRE teams in LCTs touched 
down (H-hour) and straightaway began to make 
for and prepare selected exits. At the same time 
Royal Marine Armoured Support Squadron 
(RMAS) and special obstacle-clearance sappers, 
together in LCTs, touched down. The RMAS had 
a Centaur tank, mounting a 95 mm gun, designed 
to give the infantry close support until such time 
as the self-propelled artillery was able to land. 
This was expected to be 1.5 to 5.5 hours later. 
The little Royal Navy hedgerows, just prior to 
this, were to release their bombs, so as by blast to 
create a lane through the beach obstacles, but in 
some cases the sea was too rough for them. The 
assaulting infantry companies landed from LCAs 
– five such craft being allotted to each company 
– three assault companies to the west of and 
including Courseulles-sur-Mer and two assault 
Major-General R.F.L. Keller addresses personnel of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Normandy, 6 June 1944.
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companies immediately east of Courseulles-sur-
Mer; on the left brigade sector two companies 
opposite Bernières-sur-Mer and two companies 
again on their left. 
 During the run-in the Royal Air Force gave us 
100% fighter cover. The effects of the previous 
night-bombing were visible during the darkness 
on the morning of D-Day and well after first 
light. Naval destroyers and gunfire gave accurate 
and sustained fire support. The self-propelled 
artillery put on the best shoot that they ever did 
on the four areas pre-selected for them, firing 
from roughly 10-9,000 yards out until they 
were 3,000 yards off-shore. The rockets fired 
from 3,500-3,000 yards off-shore, creating a 
devastating effect on those areas of the beach on 
which their fire fell. All of the assault infantry 
of 7 and 8 Brigades were carried in LCAs with 
Battalion Headquarters in LCHs. The reserve 
brigade was carried complete in LCI(L)s and 4th 
Special Service Brigade, less No.3 Commando, 
in LCI(S)s. 
 Even with the inevitable things going wrong 
– which was expected – the mechanics of the 
assault did work according to plan and the 
immediate beachhead objectives, which were the 
beach lateral roads from excluding la Riviere to 
include St. Aubin-sur-Mer, were secured by 1000 
– 1030 hours. 
* * * * *
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Comments by Brigadier H.F. Foster, 
Commander, 7th Canadian
Infantry Brigade
as given to Historical Officer, 22 June 1944
7 Canadian Infantry Brigade
in the Assault and the
Achievement of its Objective
1. The weather was most unkind and very nearly 
disastrous to the mounting of the assault. There 
were two major results of this inclemency:
(a) the terrific devastation which was 
to have been caused by bombing of the 
coast defense on either side of the River 
Seulles did not materialize. The only 
damage visible from the sea was that 
effected by our self-propelled artillery 
fire from LCAs. It was, therefore, all 
the more remarkable that casualties 
on the whole were so few and that the 
immediate objectives were secured as 
quickly as they were. The rapid capture of 
Courseulles-sur-Mer by the Regina Rifles 
was especially impressive. 
(b) Engineers in AVREs were intended 
to skin off the beach obstacles as the 
tide rose; another party was to prepare 
the landing exits. These sappers were 
not able to land in time and arrived, in 
some cases, up to an hour or an hour 
and a half late to find a beach crowded 
with milling men, tanks and recce cars 
of the Inns of Court Squadron, unable to 
proceed further inland. 
2. Thus, owing to the presence of mines in the 
water several LCTs were damaged and their 
vehicles unable to land from them. Some LCAs 
were blown up as they approached the beach. 
The LCA carrying Brigadier Foster narrowly 
missed striking a mine suspended from a post. 
It became impossible to manoeuvre the craft 
without running into it. He and his party therefore 
climbed over the stern into a foundered LCT and 
leapt from its bow into the waist-deep surf to get 
to the shore.
3. On the beach itself, quite apart from the 
systematic reduction of the strong points by the 
infantry, fully two hours were spent preparing 
exits, in the absence of the sappers. In his own 
sector, Brigadier Foster observed, men of the 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles with their own sappers, 
assisted later by AVRE personnel, succeeded by 
dint of great toil in preparing a road through the 
boggy ground beyond the dunes, even making use 
of paling flung over a tank which had sunk far 
into the muck. By driving heavy vehicles over it 
a firm foundation was provided and a primitive 
but usable exit was constructed. 
4. Once the tanks were able to leave the beach 
and move inland they fought fiercely and were 
of enormous help to the infantry. New to battle 
as they were, the performance of the tank crews 
was gallant rather than brilliant, but their sheer 
courage made them formidable and they profited 
quickly from hard-gained experience. 
5. The timing as planned had been too fast, as 
Brigadier Foster had always expected. In actual 
fact the immediate beachhead was secured about 
H+4, the intermediate objective from H+10 to 
12 hours, and the final objective on D+1 with 
astonishing speed. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles 
were first to reach their final objective, which 
was Putot-en-Bessin, 9072; they were followed 
by Regina Rifles in Norrey-en-Bessin, 9270.
6. Enemy counterattacks now began. On the 
afternoon of 8 June 1944 the Royal Winnipeg 
Rifles were overrun, chiefly owing to the fact 
that one assault company had been practically 
obliterated on the beach and the gaps in its ranks 
had had to be replaced by reinforcements of all 
sorts, some not even infantry. There had been no 
time for re-organization. A new counterattack by 
the 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment 
succeeded in regaining the ground however, and 
occupied Putot, with Royal Winnipeg Rifles in 
reserve. The Scottish remained there for a week 
of almost incessant shelling and mortaring. 
7. The Regina Rifles occupied the Bretteville 
area, 9271, with one detached company forward 
at Norrey, 9270. This forward position was 
too exposed and Brigadier Foster more than 
once suggested it be withdrawn. The battalion 
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Matheson, 
and the commander of the company in question 
protested vigorously, arguing that they would 
only have to recapture the village later. They 
were allowed to remain. The town was a ruin 
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and the stench of hundreds of German dead 
added to its unpleasantness. The enemy delivered 
two counterattacks against the Regina Rifles 
every night, their Panther tanks even entering 
Bretteville to the very doors of the Battalion 
Headquarters. 
8. The German attacks were launched without 
any semblance of tactical sense. The flanks of 
the battalion were exposed and the position 
almost isolated. In such a case, where a carefully 
conceived flank attack might have been deadly, 
the enemy flung himself straight against the 
strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the 
undoubted weakness of his opponent’s position. 
All his attacks were beaten off. 
9. Soon 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade entered 
the Bray area to close one gap and 49th British 
Division occupied the Brouay area on the right to 
close the other. On 16 June 1944 as a result of 
the success of 147 Brigade on the right, the Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles pushed southwards and occupied 
le Mesnil-Patry, 8970. Although they met no 
opposition, it proved to be most uncomfortable to 
hold, since it lay in a hollow and was dominated 
by the high ground of the Cheux feature to the 
south. After some days it was deemed that a 
much-deserved rest was in order. Therefore, on 
the night 18-19 June 1944, one of the shortest of 
the year, 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades 
exchanged areas in the face of the enemy, and 
without incident. 
10. To sum up his observations, Brigadier Foster 
said that 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had 
carried out its task according to plan though 
rather late in schedule. The lateness was due 
to lack of air support and the failure of the 
AVREs, both these circumstances in turn being 
attributable to foul weather. 
11. In respect of the soldier’s personal assault 
equipment, he was of the opinion that even the 
little carried was too much and that steel helmet, 
mess tins, weapon and bandolier of ammunition 
were sufficient. 
12. The outstanding features of the assault 
were, first, the admirable spirit of the men, and 
second, the excellent fire support of the artillery. 
No request for support went unanswered, and 
many infantry professed to understand for the 
first time that the gunner’s role was something 
other than to block traffic.
* * * * *
Juno Beach on the afternoon of D-Day. This is the sector at Courseulles-sur-Mer where 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
supported by the tanks of the 1st Hussars, landed.
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Comments by Brigadier K.C. 
Blackader, MC, ED, Commander of 
8th Canadian Infantry Brigade
as given to the Historical Officer, 24 June 1944
8th Canadian Infantry
Brigade in the Assault 
1. Brigadier Blackader prefaced his remarks by 
the statement that all the special training of the 
previous eight months had been carried out along 
thoroughly sound lines and had very well fitted 
the division for its task. Weapons and equipment 
so generously made available were all that could 
have been asked for. To these two facts, together 
with the excellent spirit of the assaulting troops, 
could be attributed our success. 
2. The decision to embark on the operation 
in spite of the bad weather forecast greatly 
affected 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, as the 
first hurdle to be crossed was the obstacles 
about which information was not complete, even 
granting the excellence of Intelligence work. Of 
the three possible days on which the operation 
could be undertaken (5, 6 and 7 June 1944) the 
state of the tides on 6 June 1944 gave the least 
opportunity for clearance of these obstacles. The 
rough water slowed down the incoming LCIs with 
the result that the troops were approximately a 
half hour late in touching down. This delay meant 
that the engineers lost the sole half hour available 
to them to clear the obstacles before they were 
submerged, in which state they were, of course, 
most formidable. Thus all the landing craft on 
the first tide had to beach as best they could and 
risked running on to mined obstructions. 
3. During the night 19th Canadian Field 
Regiment had become lost, but, fortunately, was 
recovered in the morning just 5 minutes before 
their fire was to commence. 
4. Another result of the bad weather was that 
visibility was poor. On the left battalion front 
(St. Aubin-sur-Mer) neither the RAF heavy 
bombers, the rockets, nor the self-propelled 
artillery actually covered the main strong point 
and the North Shore Regiment engaged it without 
the assistance of heavier arms until some time 
later. A considerable time was therefore spent in 
reducing it. 
5. Brigadier Blackader pointed out here that it 
was only the experience gained on many exercises 
of a similar nature that gave the troops confidence 
to deal with the situation, in the absence of the 
expected support. 
6. A particularly fine job was done by the Royal 
Navy who, under unfavourable circumstances, 
made their landings exactly at the right spot, even 
to the company level. 
7. The immediate beachheads in Bernières-sur-
Mer and St. Aubin-sur-Mer were both established 
within the first two hours. At this time the reserve 
battalion (Régiment de la Chaudière) was on 
Bernières-sur-Mer beach, as it had hoped it 
could be, and proceeded through to its assembly 
area according to plan. It was then joined by its 
squadron of tanks. The Brigadier and his artillery 
group commander had now landed. By 1025 
hours the self-propelled artillery was ashore and 
the reserve battalion was ready to move forward. 
All had gone as per plan thus far. 
8. The first three self-propelled artillery vehicles 
of 14th Canadian Field Regiment had just pulled 
off into a field at the right of the road and the 
detachments were preparing the gun position, 
when a hidden 88 mm gun fired on them hitting 
all three vehicles in a matter of less than a 
A group of Canadian soldiers, likely from le Régiment de 
la Chaudière, grab a bite to eat during the first days of the 
Normandy campaign. 8-9 June 1944.
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minute. They burst into flames and the huge 
quantity of ammunition carried on them (in 
addition to 105 mm ammunition, this included 
extra ammunition and mines for other arms) 
commenced to explode. The detonations lasted 
over an hour and made the area an exceedingly 
dangerous one. As a result of this incident the 
tanks were loath to leave cover and advance up 
the grassy field leading the infantry. 
9. It was then decided to move the infantry 
forward along the road. But here they came 
under machine gun crossfire. It was impossible 
to locate either gun in the long grass and it 
therefore became necessary to delay the advance 
until scouting or recce parties could pinpoint this 
opposition so that it could be dealt with. This was 
finally achieved by siting the artillery in another 
section of Bernières-sur-Mer and directing their 
fire on to a presumed position. By this means, 
and under cover of machine gun fire delivered 
by Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, our infantry 
was infiltrated up the road. 
10. This delay of approximately two hours was 
very costly because it slowed down the forward 
movement of 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
following in reserve. Eventually, however, the 
brigade got under way and proceeded to its other 
tasks; demolishing the gun position to the right 
and capturing Beny-sur-Mer, Basly, Colomby-
sur-Thaon and Anguerny. By evening both the 
Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada and the Régiment 
de la Chaudière were established on the brigade 
objective on the high ground in the vicinity of 
Anguerny. 
11. The North Shore Regiment, meanwhile, 
having cleared St. Aubin-sur-Mer to the extent 
that the commanding officer considered success 
assured, then launched a company to capture 
the strongpoint at Tailleville. This proved to be 
a much tougher nut than expected but it was 
eventually cracked in good order. The battalion 
then proceeded north to engage the famous 
Radar station near Douvres, but before coming 
to grips with it, was forced to attack and clear 
the wood northeast of it which was found to 
be honeycombed with trenches, shelters and 
tunnels, and was unable to accomplish more on 
D-Day.
12. The next day, D+1, they were again compelled 
to clear the wood, the enemy having infiltrated 
himself into it once more. They then tested the 
defences of the Radar Station. After doing this all 
day without much success they were ordered to 
by-pass it at night and join the brigade in their 
allotted area on the final objective. It should be 
stated that the widespread operations of the 
North Shore Regiment, which included forming 
a wide flank for the Commandos, maintaining a 
firm left flank for the brigade and continuing to 
move forward at the same time, made matters 
very difficult for them, so that their performance, 
under the circumstances was most creditable.
13. Brigadier Blackader added that the wide front 
on which the assault was made and the stress 
which had been laid on advancing inland with all 
possible speed had prevented a thorough search 
and any mopping up being carried out between 
the various axes of advance. This subsequently 
necessitated elements of the brigade being 
employed for two days on clearing certain villages 
to track down snipers and small parties left 
behind. The enemy everywhere very tenaciously 
and bravely stuck to his post and slowed the 
advance. 
14. The operation proved that planning had 
been sound as to administration arrangements. 
A “Priest” 105 mm self-propelled howitzer, the mainstay 
of the Royal Canadian Artillery regiments that landed on 
D-Day
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Assault scale transport had been properly loaded 
to provide the immediate essentials during the 
early days. No one went short of ammunition, 
tools, food or water. 
15. The work of the medical services was of the 
very highest standard. Nothing but praise could 
be given to them, from stretcher-bearers, Medical 
Officers, to higher levels, for all had done their 
utmost. 
16. With regard to intercommunication, Brigadier 
Blackader said that, despite the large number of 
wireless sets and the mass of frequencies in use, 
communications throughout could be considered 
better than on many exercises. Moreover, line was 
laid to all battalions by the night of D-Day.
17. There was absolutely no doubt in Brigadier 
Blackader’s mind that one of the largest 
contributing factors to the success of the 
early stages of the operation, at least in 8th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, was the fine spirit 
of co-operation built up during the months of 
training between the Captain G J2 and his staff 
(RN) and the staff and battalions of the brigade. 
The two services worked together harmoniously 
and perfectly exemplified the term “Combined 
Operations.”
* * * * *
Comments by Brigadier D.G. 
Cunningham, DSO, Commander of 
9th Canadian Infantry Brigade
as given to the Historical Officer, 26 June 1944
The Action of the Reserve Brigade
1. 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was reserve 
brigade in the assault on the French coast 6 June 
1944. All the rifle companies of its three Highland 
battalions were borne across the Channel in a 
flotilla of 10 LCIs manned by personnel of the 
Royal Canadian Navy. 
2. The brigade was landed without mishap about 
1100 hours on Nan White Beach at Bernières-
sur-Mer, instead of being spread over Nan White 
and Red as had been planned. Casualties on the 
beach were few and in the advance inland through 
8th Canadian Infantry Brigade sniper activity 
constituted the sole opposition. 
3. By nightfall, however, the first enemy 
counterattack composed of recce elements, was 
met by the North Nova Scotia Highlanders and 
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment in Villons-
les-Buissons. This engagement signified the 
brigade’s first encounter with serious resistance. 
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada, Stormont 
Dundas and Glengary Highlanders and Brigade 
Headquarters were in Basly. 
4. D+1 saw the advance guard (North Nova 
Scotia Highlanders and 27th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment) moving swiftly forward, extending 
its foremost elements throughout Buron into 
Authie. They were met here by a severe enemy 
counterattack by elements of 21st Panzer 
Division. Enemy tanks swept in from St. Contest 
and Gruchy and inflicted heavy casualties in men 
and tanks, two-thirds of a company of infantry 
being lost. 
5. Late in the afternoon the North Nova 
Highlanders on the orders of the Brigade 
Commander withdrew through Stormont, 
Dundas and Glengary Highlanders into the 
brigade fortress at Les Buissons. They had 
suffered numerous casualties, including three 
company commanders. Out of twenty officers of 
the original rifle companies only eight remained. 
6. Undoubtedly the courageous defence of 
Authie and Buron absorbed the force of the 
enemy counterattack and prevented a penetration 
of similar dimensions into the Les Buissons 
area. 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment had 
accounted for at least thirty of his light half-track 
recce cars and is believed to have knocked out 
as many of his tanks. Our own tank losses, while 
considerable, were fewer. 
7. This battle was the first one of major 
proportions on 3rd Canadian Division’s front. 
Attacks on a comparable scale were not met by 
7th Canadian Infantry Brigade until the following 
day, and then both Royal Winnipeg Rifles and 
Regina Rifles were in defence positions. 
8. An interesting example of enemy ingenuity 
is afforded by the skill of a German wireless 
operator whose set was functioning on the 
brigade link to 27th Armoured Regiment, and Ph
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who quickly adopted our wireless procedure, 
even to such details as “Report my signals” 
and “Say again all after…” His cleverness was 
annoying at the most, since it became difficult to 
know if wireless messages were being received, 
but his skill at mimicry was such that by the end 
of the day he could imitate the voice of Colonel 
Gordon, Officer Commanding 27th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment.
9. During the day personnel of Brigade 
Headquarters, moving forward, had taken about 
200 prisoners of war driven out of Tailleville by 
the North Shore Regiment. 
10. On the night of 7 June 1944 weaker infantry 
and armoured blows were delivered at the 
but lately consolidated brigade area and were 
repelled by the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
Highlanders and 27th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment with the artillery support of 12th and 
14th Canadian Field Regiments. 
11. The brigade was now disposed as follows: 
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and 
the remnants of North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
in Les Buissons; Highland Light Infantry of 
Canada in Villons les Buissons; and Brigade 
Headquarters in Colomby-sur-Thaon. Subsequent 
lesser attacks and intermittent shelling and 
mortaring have been withstood by North Nova 
Scotia Highlanders and Stormont, Dundas and 
Glengarry Highlanders. Reinforcements arriving 
on D+4 brought the depleted ranks of North Nova 
Scotia Highlanders up to strength. 
12. Brigadier Cunningham pointed out that the 
brigade had worked out in combination with 27th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment a scheme for a 
completely mobile brigade, which was introduced 
for the first time on 6 June 1944 and proved most 
successful on that and the following day. Three 
companies of North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
were carried on tanks and the balance in unit 
vehicles; in the other battalions, one company 
each was borne in unit transport, the others 
riding light bicycles (airborne pattern). These 
bicycles, though slight in construction, have very 
well withstood wear and tear and are still in use.
* * * * *
Troops from the 9th (Reserve) Brigade come ashore at Bernières-sur-Mer on the afternoon of 
D-Day. Note the bicycles being carried ashore to give increased mobility to the Brigade.
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Extract from Second Canadian 
Armoured Brigade, Operation 
Overlord: The Assault on the 
Beaches of Normandy, 6-11 June 
1944, Sequence of Events and 
Lessons Arising Therefrom.
Lessons Arising from the Operation
Intercommunication
1. The 38 and 18 set not for tank-infantry 
intercommunication did not prove successful. 
This may be attributed in part to confusion in 
the initial stages. 
2. In future tank-cum-infantry operations it is 
desirable that an infantry officer should ride in 
the squadron leader’s tank with the spare 19 
set on the infantry battalion frequency. In any 
case this set should always be so netted when 
operating with infantry. 
3. The installation of a phone for infantry on 
the outside of the tank is essential. Until this is 
done the only substitute is a hand-set passed out 
through the pistol port. 
4. Crew commanders must NOT lean out of 
tanks to speak to personnel on the ground. The 
target so presented is ideal for snipers. 
19 Set in Sherman VC Tanks.
5. It has been found that the 19 set in Sherman 
VC’s has a tendency to drift off net when 
the 17-pounder gun is fired. This should be 
investigated with a view to finding some remedy. 
Enemy Direction Finding on Netting Calls
6.  Instances have been reported of enemy 
shellfire coming down on tanks immediately 
following a group netting call. This may be 
coincidence, but the possibility of enemy 
Direction Finding should not be discounted. 
Passage of Information
7. Passage of information both from rear to 
forward and from forward to rear was not good. 
What little that passed was slow and often very 
inaccurate. Information on immediate flanking 
formations was either too late to be of use or 
completely lacking. This contributed largely to 
the failure of the attack through le Mesnil-Patry 
on 11 June. 
8. Information regarding our own minefields 
was sketchy in the extreme and several tanks 
were disabled on minefields laid by infantry with 
whom they were working at the time. 
9. Our tanks shelled our own infantry in a 
forward locality on D+5. One company had been 
in that locality since D-Day but tanks had not 
been informed. 
10. Too much stress cannot be laid on close 
personal liaison between all arms. This must 
never stop. It must continue at rest, training, 
planning and right through the actual operation. 
If information is not forthcoming through normal 
channels then “aggressive inquisitiveness” will 
root it out.
Brigadier R.A. Wyman, commander of 2nd Canadian 
Armoured Brigade, photographed in Bernières-sur-Mer 
just after he landed on D-Day.
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Co-operation Between Different Arms
11. Despite early training, there was evidence of 
lack of appreciation of the other fellow’s role and 
his difficulties. This leads to misconceptions and 
unsound employment of forces. 
12. From a tank commander’s point of view, 
there seemed to be a general impression in 
the infantry that the main anti-tank weapon is 
the tank and moreover that a tank should be 
employed to destroy enemy anti-tank weapons. 
On several occasions tanks were asked to lead in 
attacks on manned anti-tank defences. This they 
did, in order to maintain the momentum of the 
assault, and suffered unduly high casualties in 
consequence. They were expected to remain on 
a captured objective for several days when they 
should have been withdrawn to rally and their 
place taken by artillery and infantry anti-tank 
guns. Whenever tanks threatened a defended 
locality our infantry often called for tanks to 
come forward instead of meeting the attack with 
properly-sited anti-tank guns. It is realized of 
course that conditions of war were by no means 
normal. It is felt, however, that these incidents 
should be brought to light so that acts dictated 
by exceptional conditions do not become a habit 
in more normal times. 
13. It is the policy of this brigade to give all 
possible assistance to the infantry whenever 
and wherever it can. Tanks will be in support 
and not under command of infantry below a 
divisional level. Tank commanders on all levels 
will co-operate with infantry to the full. At the 
same time it is their duty to advise on the proper 
employment of tanks. It will be rarely if ever that 
an infantry commander will try to insist on the 
misuse of tanks. Should he do so, however, the 
tank’s commander will be in duty bound to refer 
the matter to his next higher commander. 
14. The fullest co-operation can only be achieved 
by complete understanding of the equipment 
and functions of other arms. Each and every 
opportunity should be taken for tank and 
infantry personnel to train and live together. 
Wherever possible, simple tank-cum-infantry 
exercises should be laid on, based on operational 
experiences. This should be done after every 
action as the turnover of personnel, particularly 
infantry, will be continual. In rest areas squadrons 
and companies should harbour close to each 
other and all ranks be encouraged to mix and 
learn what they can of each other’s habits, 
equipment and point of view generally. 
Forward Observation Officers (FOOs)
15.  Armoured regiments have still much to learn 
regarding the employment of FOOs. Visits of two 
or three days to armoured regiments by FOOs 
would benefit both. FOOs would learn the type 
of targets that armour will ask them to engage 
A joint armoured-infantry briefing taking 
place between the Regina Rifles and the 
Fort Garry Horse prior to an operation in 
Normandy, 22 June 1944.
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and armoured personnel would learn how to ask 
for fire and what the artillery is capable of giving 
them. Intercommmunication between FOOs and 
tanks is not satisfactory and a sound working 
system must be tied up.
Mines and Booby Traps
16. Here again armoured regiments are lacking 
in knowledge and experience. Close liaison with 
Royal Canadian Engineer personnel must be 
maintained and demonstrations of laying and 
lifting mines and booby traps arranged. 
Village Fighting
17. Tanks are not best suited for town or village 
fighting. Their field of manouevre is nil and they 
are an easy prey to sticky bombs, grenades and 
snipers. They will however be called upon at 
times to support infantry into built-up areas. 
This is normally done by support fire from a 
commanding position outside the town or village. 
If it is necessary to go right in, infantry must 
definitely lead. Not more than one troop should 
be employed in each thrust. Tanks should be 
inter-supporting and one tank in each troop 
should be detailed to cover 
upper story windows and house 
tops. The rear tanks gun should 
cover the rear. Tanks should 
move close enough together to 
give each other support around 
bends in the road. 
18. Tanks  and in fantry 
commanders should travel 
together and maintain the 
closest liaison.
19. All ranks, in particular 
c r e w  c o m m a n d e r s ,  w i l l 
avoid exposing themselves 
unnecessarily as snipers are 
usually prevalent.
20. Types of Tanks best suited 
for village fighting.
(a) S h e r m a n  V C  - 
unwieldy within a village. It 
might be employed from a commanding 
position to destroy concrete and other 
masonry strong points.
(b) Sherman 75 mm – most suitable for 
assaulting a defended village. 
(c) Stuart – too light and vulnerable for 
this type of work. 
21. It should be remembered that artillery 
concentrations have little killing effect on built-
up areas where observed tank fire may destroy 
located enemy positions.
Control
22. When putting tanks into a large built-up area, 
control will be assisted by the use of a large-
scale map and plans. Sectors should be picked 
out in planning with a view to clearing them up 
piecemeal in detail. 
Speculative Shooting
23. Crew commanders must be impressed with 
the value of controlled speculative shooting 
when searching ground. A few rounds of high 
A Sherman VC (Firefly) of 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade near 
Courseulles-sur-Mer, 8-10 June 1944.
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explosives on likely positions will often flush anti-
tank and machine gun crews. It may be advisable 
to detail one tank per troop to search trees and 
upper storeys, also using speculative rounds. 
Target Indication
24. Verey Lights - Targets may be indicated 
effectively by infantry shooting in their direction 
with verey lights.
Organization of Regiment and Employment of 
Sherman VC
25. As a result of experience gained in this 
campaign it has been decided to organize 
squadrons on a four tank troop basis. Each troop 
will have three 75 mm and one 17-pounder. The 
position of the troop leader will be left for units 
to decide. It has been suggested that the troop 
leader should ride in the 17-pounder tank, whose 
normal position would be back of the other three 
tanks. It is probably better, however, for the troop 
leader to lead in a 75 mm tank leaving his troop 
sergeant to cover the troop in the Sherman Vc. 
This tank should be so placed as to give the 
maximum support if the troop bumped into heavy 
armour.
26. It is felt that heavy tanks may 
be encountered at any time and 
anywhere. If our hard hitting 
17-pounders are consolidated in 
one group it is unlikely that they 
would be immediately available 
when most wanted. 
27. Whilst we gave at least as 
good as we took in the first six 
days of this operation, the vital 
necessity of seizing ground at 
all costs resulted in heavy tank 
casualties. All units are therefore 
down well below estimates and 
it will be some time before they 
can be built up again and a 
healthy reserve accumulated. 
In the meantime, regiments will 
be based on a strength of 49 
Shermans as follows:
Regimental Headquarters 
(RHQ) – (4 tanks) and three 
squadrons, each having a squadron 
headquarters (3 tanks) and three troops 
of 4 tanks each. 
Enemy Equipment and Methods
28. The 88 mm still appears to be the enemy’s 
most formidable anti-tank weapon. It is most 
effective against Shermans at ranges up to 3,000 
yards. All his anti-tank guns are very well sited 
and full use is made of dummy guns as decoys. 
Snipers have been found dug in well forward 
of anti-tank gun positions. These force crew 
commanders to close down and limit their field 
of vision. 
29. Tanks encountered so far have been Marks 
III and IV and Panthers. Tigers have also been 
reported but not confirmed. Mark IVs have been 
captured dressed up with light spaced armour 
to resemble the Tiger. The deception is hard 
to detect. It can be stated definitely that we are 
outgunned both by the long 75 mm and the 88 
mm.
30. It has been noted that the Panther travels with 
the gun at 12 o’clock. It is not traversed until the 
A 75 mm Sherman of the 
Sherbrooke Fusiliers.
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tank halts. One killing was made well up in our 
forward lines of 4 Panthers with guns actually 
strapped down. 
31. The enemy appears to move in line ahead 
waiting until he bumps into opposition before 
deploying. Once deployed however he makes the 
best use of ground and natural cover such as 
hedges and bushes. 
32. Snipers have been a constant menace taking 
a heavy toll of crew commanders. 
Own Equipment and Methods
33. Sherman VC – has proved a very effective 
anti-tank weapon and in view of the fact that 
we are outgunned, it is strongly urged that the 
proportion of those tanks in the squadron be 
increased as early as possible. 
34. .50 Browning on Tanks – Differences of 
opinion have been expressed as to the value of 
this weapon mounted on tanks. Commanding 
officers may retain it or discard it at their 
discretion. The use of this gun on B Echelon 
vehicles should be explored before it is turned 
back to ordinance.
35. 2-inch Bomb – it has been suggested that 
the infantry 2-inch bomb projected from the 
tank bomb thrower would be effective against 
infantry in slit trenches and enclosed places such 
as orchards and farm yards. This possibility will 
be explored. 
36. It is possible that so far smoke has not been 
used to the best advantage. It is suggested that 
squadron leaders may have been moving too 
close to their forward troops to be in a position 
to use it. Reports from Italy indicate that the 75 
mm smoke shell is not reliable as it is impossible 
to control its bounce. Smoke grenades and the 
2-inch smoke bomb were apparently found more 
effective.
37. Three important uses of smoke should be 
borne in mind:
(a) Defilading observed fire from the 
flank.
(b) Blinding weapons which high 
explosives cannot neutralize.
(c) Cover for local withdrawal.
Use of Ground
38.  Proper use has not been made of ground in 
many cases. Tanks and squadrons must move 
tactically deployed when in enemy territory. The 
minimum number of tanks must be exposed to 
enemy fire and tanks must always be mutually 
supporting. Careful planning, good use of ground 
with mutual support means more kills for less 
casualties.
Use of Artillery
39. Artillery properly employed is a factor 
contributing to the success of most operations. 
A pre-arranged fire plan is essential and 
commanders must consider and advise the 
gunners of the priority rating of suspected targets. 
When fire has been called for through FOOs, 
tanks must remember to wait for it to come down 
before advancing into the target area. 
Infantry on Tanks 
40. Carrying infantry on tanks can be overdone. 
It is an excellent means of moving them quickly 
to a pre-arranged assembly area from the rear 
when the enemy is not likely to be encountered. 
In future infantry will NOT be carried on tanks 
in forward areas. 
AFV Recognition 
41. The present situation is NOT satisfactory. It is 
difficult in this close country to recognize friend 
from foe at long but vulnerable ranges. Several 
instances of engagements between our own tanks 
have already come to light. A white star on the 
sides of tanks is an obvious aiming mark and will 
NOT be used by units in this brigade. The use of 
standard tank flags discloses our positions to the 
enemy and has proved more assistance to him 
than to us. Firing verey lights has been suggested 
as a possible solution and it is proposed to try 
this out in this brigade. It is hoped that some 
practicable system, common to all formations, 
will be laid down by higher authority. 
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